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THE COSTS OF BIRD STRIKES AND BIRD STRIKE 
PREVENTION 
JOHN R. ALLAN
Abstract: Collisions between birds (and other wildlife) and aircraft are known to cause substantial losses to the aviation industry 
in terms of damage and delays every year. Techniques exist to control bird numbers on airfields and hence to reduce the number 
of wildlife strikes, but they are applied at widely different levels from airport to airport. Some of this variation may be due to 
differing levels of strike-risk at the different sites, but much of it is due to the unwillingness or inability of the airports concerned 
to invest in bird strike prevention. Part of the reason for this reluctance to invest in airport bird control is a lack of understanding 
of the true costs to the airlines in terms of direct damage to aircraft and in delays and cancellations. Previous estimates of the 
cost of bird strikes have concentrated only on measurable repair costs and have not attempted to assign costs to aircraft delays. 
My paper uses newly available data from major international airlines to provide the first estimate for the total cost of bird strikes 
to the world’s airline fleet. Much of the data are commercially confidential and sources cannot be quoted nor the accuracy of 
the data verified. The estimates also rely on information from a very small number of airlines to produce extrapolations for the 
worldwide costs of damage and delays. Although these are major international carriers, and as representative as possible of the 
world bird strike problem as a whole, the results should be interpreted with a suitable level of caution. A tentative and probably 
conservative estimate of US$1.2 billion per year in damage and delays is the outcome of this calculation. The costs of bird damage 
are evaluated relative to the ability of managers to pay for bird control programs and the derived benefits thereof. Reasons for the 
industry’s failure to invest further to reduce the costs of bird strikes are examined.
Key Words: aircraft, airports, bird strikes, collisions, costs, economics, management, worldwide.
Collisions between birds and aircraft (bird 
strikes) can have catastrophic consequences and have 
resulted in the loss of at least 190 lives and 52 aircraft 
in civil aviation (Thorpe 1996). Military losses are 
more difficult to estimate, but there have been 283 
military aircraft lost and 141 deaths recorded in a lim-
ited number of western nations from which data are 
available between 1959 and 1999 (Richardson and West 
2000). The outcome of most bird strikes is far less 
severe, and the majority (65%) result in no damage to 
the aircraft at all (Milsom and Horton 1995). Those 
strikes that do damage aircraft or result in precaution-
ary delays are an important cause of economic loss 
to the industry. To both preserve public safety and to 
reduce this loss as far as possible, the International Civil 
Aviation Authority (ICAO) recommends that airports 
should take steps to reduce the risk of bird strikes as 
far as reasonably possible. This recommendation may be 
reinforced by separate national regulations that require 
airports to take steps to reduce the bird strike risk (e.g., 
United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority 1998). 
Bird strike prevention can be expensive and there 
has been no previous analysis of the costs and benefits 
it can bring to the aviation industry. Although the costs 
of bird control are easily determined, the costs of bird 
strikes to airlines are rarely collated in such a way 
that they can be separated from other operational costs 
(e.g., damage due to impacts with other objects such 
as debris on the runway etc.). Existing estimates of 
bird strike costs have relied on evaluating all of the 
bird strikes reported to a given nation; determining the 
levels of damage on a three-level scale (low, medium, 
severe); and then using the relatively small number 
of cases where damage costs are known to estimate 
an average cost for a given damage level (Cleary et 
al. 2000). This technique relies on assumptions being 
made about the number of unreported strikes and takes 
no account of the financial costs to the airlines of delays 
and cancellations resulting from aircraft needing safety 
checks or repairs following a bird strike incident.
Some airlines are now beginning to collate bird 
strike costs, and to determine the costs to the company 
of delays and cancellations. This has enabled an alterna-
tive approach to estimating bird strike costs to be under-
taken. This technique uses actual costs to airlines of 
bird strike damage and uses accurately calculated cost 
data for delays and cancellations applied to the world 
airline fleet.
This revised approach allows the cost and ben-
efits of additional investment in bird strike prevention 
to be calculated more accurately than has previously 
been possible. It also illustrates some of the problems 
inherent in a system where one commercial company 
(the airport) is spending money to allow another (the 
airline) to save on costs.
Many of the data presented throughout this paper 
are commercially confidential, and to obtain them it was 
necessary not to identify the companies from which 
they came. Additionally, it has been necessary to avoid 
presenting the data in such a way that the identity of the 
company could be inferred (e.g., by quoting an aircraft 
movement rate that would identify an airline). Some of 
the calculations undertaken are thus not presented in 
full, and none of the sources of previously unpublished 
information is identified. Although failing to attribute 
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sources of data is unusual, all data have been obtained 
from authoritative sources (e.g., company flight safety 
officers), and this is the only way that this paper could 
be produced. 
CURRENT ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF BIRD 
STRIKE DAMAGE
Reliable estimates of the cost of bird strikes to 
civil aviation are difficult to obtain, because of the fail-
ure of commercial airlines to collate bird strike damage 
data separately from other costs and because of the poor 
standard of reporting of bird strike incidents around 
the world. For example, Cleary et al. (2000) estimate 
that only 1 in 5 bird strikes in the United States is 
reported. It is impossible to determine whether the 
unreported strikes are those that result in no damage or 
whether damaging, and therefore costly, strikes are also 
unreported, and if so at what rate. Cleary et al. (2000) 
therefore provide minimum and maximum estimates for 
cost of damage and aircraft downtime in the United 
States. These range from 94,373 hours downtime and 
US$78.2 million in repair costs assuming that all damag-
ing strikes are reported, to 471,867 hours downtime 
and US$391.4 million in repairs if only 1 in 5 damaging 
strikes is reported each year. 
Accurate estimates of damage costs are easier to 
obtain from military aviation. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) 
suffers around US$33 million per year in damage to 
aircraft (including aircraft losses) (USAF Bird Aircraft 
Strike Hazard Team personal communication) while the 
United Kingdom Royal Air Force (RAF) suffers around 
US$23.3 million in bird strike damage (excluding costs 
of lost aircraft) annually (RAF Inspectorate of Flight 
Safety personal communication). 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
TO ESTIMATING COSTS
The cost calculation used here takes advantage 
of the fact that one major U.S. airline has a system 
that accurately tracks repair costs and flight delays due 
to bird strikes. The company is confident that its staff 
reports all bird strikes and the direct costs can thus be 
determined without concerns about failure to report. 
The disadvantage of this method is that it relies on a 
single company for a cost estimation, and, at present, 
data are only available for a single year. Thus, if the 
company concerned was fortunate enough to avoid any 
major bird strikes in that year then the estimate of 
damage costs will be artificially low. For example, a 
single incident that results in a total engine loss could 
incur a bill of US$5 million for a replacement engine. 
The presence or absence of 1 or 2 incidents of this 
nature could easily double or halve the total cost esti-
mate for repairs. It would be preferable, therefore, to 
use data from several airlines for a period of several 
years, but this information is not yet available. 
The U.S. airline that supplied the cost figures 
for bird strikes assumes that, on average, each primary 
delay or cancellation (the delay or cancellation to the 
aircraft that was actually struck) results in 4 secondary 
delays or cancellations, either to subsequent flights to 
be made by that aircraft or to connecting flights that 
need to be held for passengers. The average costs 
of these delays and cancellations were obtained from 
another major U.S. carrier that has gathered the infor-
mation in order to determine how both bird strikes 
and other sources of delay (e.g., failure of aircrew to 
report on time, air traffic control delays etc.) affect its 
business (Table 1). These figures are rounded estimates 
calculated for business planning purposes. Errors in 
these estimations may significantly affect the estimates 
of total cost (see below).
Table 1. Estimated costs of primary and secondary 
delays and cancellations to commercial transport air-
craft (source major US airline).
Primary Delay US$75,000
Primary Cancellation US$75,000
Secondary Delay US$35,000
Secondary Cancellation US$75,000
Data for damage repair costs that do not require 
assumptions about reporting rates are therefore now 
available. By combining these with cost and frequency 
estimates for primary and secondary delays and cancel-
lations, and dividing the total cost by the number of 
flights flown by the airline concerned, it is possible to 
calculate a cost per flight for bird strike damage. This 
cost can be extrapolated to any other airline, country, 
etc. where the air traffic movement rate is known. The 
one major assumption involved is that the rate of damag-
ing bird strikes per flight is the same for the airline 
from which the cost data were obtained as it is for 
other airlines or countries around the world. The airline 
involved is one of the world’s largest and, although 
the majority of its operations are in the United States, 
it operates substantial numbers of flights around the 
world. It is thus one of the most representative samples 
of the world aviation business. The accuracy of the 
calculation would be improved if data from airlines 
that operate predominately outside the United States 
becomes available in the future.
The cost calculation presented here is restricted 
to the costs described above. There are other costs of 
bird strikes, such as increased insurance premiums for 
airlines and loss of passenger goodwill (and possibly 
repeat business) following significant delays. Other 
costs include the design of engines and aircraft to resist 
bird strike damage and the additional fuel costs and 
global pollution that result from stronger and heavier 
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aircraft being developed to give additional bird strike 
resistance.
COST CALCULATION
The worldwide cost of bird strikes can be 
expressed mathematically as:
n
((Σa+(75,000*b)+(75,000*c)+(75,000*4b)+(35,000*4c)) ld)*e
i
where 
a is the cost of damage repairs suffered by the 
airline supplying the cost data for each individual bird 
strike summed for the n incidents suffered in 1999.
b is the number of primary cancellations suffered 
in 1999 as a result of bird strikes by the airline supplying 
data.
c is the number of primary delays suffered in 1999 
as a result of bird strikes by the airline supplying data.
d is the number of air transport movements for 
the airline concerned.
e is the number of air transport movements for 
the world fleet.
Substituting values supplied by the airline, and 
using world Air Transport Movement (ATM) data from 
ICAO, the total cost of bird strikes for the world fleet is 
estimated at US$1,255,726,475 per year, which equates 
to US$64.50 per flight. 
The airline supplying information for this paper 
suffered a total of 1,326 bird strikes in 1999. The total 
cost of repairs resulting from bird strike damage was 
US$6,200,000 and the estimated total cost of delays and 
cancellations was US$46,450,000 making a total annual 
cost of US$52,650,000, or US$39,705 per bird strike 
event.
These estimates do not include helicopter traffic, 
nor the private aviation sector where smaller aircraft 
operating at lower speeds are involved. The costs of bird 
strikes to these aircraft may be different than costs for 
commercial airliners. The consequent costs in terms of 
delays and cancellations will also be substantially lower.
Assuming that the costs incurred by the airline 
supplying the information are typical of companies 
operating fixed-wing transport aircraft, then any airline 
can estimate the costs incurred for its organization 
simply by multiplying the total number of strikes experi-
enced by US$39,705. Similarly, a national regulator can 
estimate the costs of bird strikes to transport aircraft 
in its territory by the same means. The accuracy of 
this cost calculation will, of course, depend upon the 
proportion of the bird strikes that have been reported. 
An alternative approach where reporting is thought to 
be unreliable would be to multiply the total number 
of ATMs for the country concerned by US$64.50 to 
arrive at a cost estimate independent of reporting rates.  
Any difference in the two estimates may give an indica-
tion of the level of non-reporting of bird strikes in the 
country or organization concerned.
LIMITS TO ACCURACY OF THE COST ESTIMATE
Because the data used to arrive at the cost esti-
mates above are from such a small number of sources 
and cannot be independently verified, there is consider-
able scope for bias in the final result caused either by 
errors in the original data or by the fact that the data 
may not be representative of the industry as a whole. To 
better describe this possible bias the cost calculations 
have been repeated assuming a variation of plus or 
minus 10% in the annual total for damage costs and in 
the costs of delays and cancellations. The cost estimate 
has a range of US$1.27 to US$1.24 billion (a range of 
2.4% of the original US$1.25 billion estimate) if the 
cost of direct damage is varied by plus or minus 10%. 
If the estimated costs of delays and cancellations are 
varied by the same amount the cost estimate has a range 
of US$1.36 to US$1.14 billion (17.6%). Similarly, if the 
number of secondary delays and cancellations resulting 
from a primary delay or cancellation due to bird strike 
is varied by plus or minus 10%, i.e., from 3.6 to 4.4, 
the range in the resulting estimate of costs is US$1.18 
to US$1.33 billion (12% of the original estimate). This 
basic sensitivity analysis shows that it is the estimation 
of numbers of secondary delays and cancellations and 
the estimated cost of these that has the greatest effect 
on the final cost estimation. It is also here that the data 
are less certain, relying on company estimates which 
are not verifiable. Nevertheless, a world wide cost esti-
mate for bird strike damage and delays of US$1 billion 
to US$1.5 billion per year for large transport aircraft 
remains the best estimate available.
EXISTING WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT OPTIONS 
FOR AIRPORTS AND THEIR COSTS
The basic premise underlying bird management 
on aerodromes is that reducing the number of birds 
present on and around the airfield will reduce the prob-
ability of a bird strike. The relationship between bird 
abundance and strike frequency is a complex one, how-
ever. At the national level, changes in bird numbers 
coincide with changes in strike frequency for those 
species where reliable data are available e.g., Canada 
geese (Branta canadensis) in the United States (Cleary 
et al. 2000), lapwings (Vanellus vanellus) in the United 
Kingdom (Bell 1999) and a variety of species of birds 
over 2 kg in weight (Allan et al. 1999). At the airport 
level, behavior of local populations of birds may have 
profound effects on the bird strike risk. For example, a 
change in the feeding location of one group of Canada 
geese that causes them to fly over the airfield could 
profoundly increase the strike risk at an airport without 
any change in total bird abundance. This may allow 
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an airport bird control program to target particular 
groups of birds that are increasing risk levels dispropor-
tionately, thus obtaining a greater benefit at reduced 
cost (Cooper 1991).
Bird management on airports usually seeks to 
modify the behavior of birds to reduce the numbers that 
come into the operating environment of the aircraft. 
The techniques used may involve the killing of some 
birds, but this is normally done to enhance the effec-
tiveness of other techniques rather than to reduce total 
numbers in a local population. Conventionally, this bird 
control comprises 2 main elements: 1) habitat manage-
ment to reduce the availability of resources such as food 
and water to the birds, and 2) active bird deterrence, 
either in the form of scaring devices or ‘bird patrols’ 
where airport staff or contractors actively deter or 
remove birds from sensitive areas using techniques such 
as pyrotechnics, recorded distress calls, or live ammu-
nition. The most effective combination of techniques 
depends on the environmental conditions that prevail at 
the airport concerned and on the bird species that are 
causing the hazard. For example, Brough and Bridg-
man (1980) found that cultivating a dense grass sward 
15 to 20 cm long reduced numbers of gulls (Larus sp.) 
lapwings (Vanellus vanellus), golden plovers (Pluvialis 
apricaria), and starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) on airfields 
in Great Britain by up to 75% compared to short grass 
(5- to 10-cm) swards. In contrast, 15- to 20-cm grass 
swards in areas where large birds of prey are abundant 
may cause significant problems because they can sup-
port large populations of small mammals, which attract 
raptors and owls (J-L Briot personal communication, 
Barras 2000). Whatever the techniques employed, large-
scale habitat management on airfields is likely to involve 
significant costs, and the deployment of staff and/or 
equipment for bird scaring is a further ongoing cost to 
the airport operator.
The maintenance of bird-repellent grass swards of 
the type used in the United Kingdom involves regular 
cutting of the grass, removal of cuttings once a year 
and applications of fertilizers, selective herbicides, and 
occasionally, insecticides (Mead and Carter 1973, UK 
CAA 1998). The frequency of cutting and the need 
for chemical treatments varies from site to site, but 
typical costs range from US$80,000 to US$250,000 per 
year (RAF Strike Command personal communication). 
In an effort to reduce chemicals and the costs of main-
tenance, alternative poor, long grass swards have been 
developed in some countries. These involve reducing 
the nutrient status of the soil to reduce grass growth 
and hence lower cutting frequency as well as encourag-
ing a diverse flora by eliminating the use of herbicides 
and insecticides. Such methods would reduce the cost 
of maintenance considerably (to around US$5,000 to 
US$10,000 per year) (Dekker 2000), but their effective-
ness compared to the more expensive regime has not 
been rigorously tested. 
Elsewhere in the world, different habitat manage-
ment regimes are employed. For example, in desert 
environments, where cultivating grass swards is impos-
sible, the airfield is simply rolled flat and no vegetation 
is permitted to grow. This results in little or no bird 
attraction. Airfields situated in swampy habitats rely on 
drainage or netting of wetland areas to deter shorebirds 
or fish-eating species that are the main hazards at these 
sites (Bird Strike Committee Europe 1990). Unfortu-
nately, data on the costs of these activities are rarely 
available.
As well as managing the airfield habitat, many 
airports need to manage other features to make them 
unattractive to birds. Examples include bird-proofing 
buildings to deny access to birds such as house spar-
rows (Passer domesticus) or feral pigeons (Columba 
livia), or modifying amenity plantings to remove trees 
or bushes that offer roosting or nesting sites to birds. 
The costs of these operations vary depending on the 
nature and scope of the works involved.
In summary, it is likely that an effective habitat 
management regime (i.e., one which has a significant 
effect on the numbers of birds using the airfield or 
its surroundings) might cost an airport in the region 
US$75,000 per year to implement in Western Europe. 
The different management techniques and differences 
in labor costs in other parts of the world might signifi-
cantly alter these figures.
The second element of airfield bird control, active 
bird control, can be similarly difficult to cost. On most 
civil airports, the bird control staff is part of the opera-
tions or fire departments which have duties other than 
bird control. Few airports separate the costs of their 
bird management programs from the other functions of 
the departments concerned and separate costings are 
thus difficult to obtain. Some airports, however, employ 
contractors to provide bird control services and in these 
cases the costs of the services are readily available. In 
the United Kingdom, the RAF employs contractors at 
almost all of its airfields. Annual costs vary between 
US$130,000 for 24-hour bird control involving continu-
ous patrolling, bird dispersal, and wildlife depredation 
services on a fast jet station, and US$65,000 for patrol-
ling between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. At a training station 
(RAF Strike Command personal communication). In 
the United States, costs of bird control programs vary 
between US$25,000 for a basic harassment program 
conducted by military staff to US$150,000 per year for a 
full bird control program involving falconry (R. Dolbeer 
personal communication).
Airports also need to influence the types of devel-
opment that occur close to their property in case these 
attract birds. In some countries, the types of develop-
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ment that are allowed near airports are restricted (e.g., 
landfills might be prohibited within a certain distance), 
while in others, airports are given the opportunity to 
object to bird-attracting developments close to the site.  
The costs of evaluating developments close to airports 
can be considerable, requiring the use of expert consul-
tants, and if a legal dispute results, costs can become 
very high indeed. Even if the airport is successful in 
preventing a development without resorting to legal 
action, there will be opportunity costs to the developer 
whose application has been denied.
THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING BIRD 
STRIKE PREVENTION MEASURES
Milsom and Horton (1995) showed that, where a 
bird control program was already in place at an airport, 
increased investment was only effective in reducing the 
number of bird strikes if it resulted in a specified level 
of bird control efficiency score. The way that this score 
was derived was not precisely defined, but it required 
the implementation of standard bird repellent grass, 
the provision of bird control equipment in the form of 
pyrotechnics and distress calls, staff who had attended 
a recognized training course and a specified level of 
staff presence on the airfield (T.P. Milsom, personal 
communication). Based on estimates provided by the 
RAF, this level of bird control and habitat management 
would cost around US$200,000 per year per airfield to 
implement in the United Kingdom. Less expensive pro-
grams may have significant benefits in situations where 
bird control is minimal or absent, or where investment 
can be made in large-scale reductions in bird popula-
tions close to airports. For example, the implementation 
of even the most basic bird scaring at an airport with 
large numbers of large birds such as geese on or close 
to the runway would significantly reduce the risk of a 
costly strike. 
One example of the costs and benefits of a sub-
stantial bird control program is available from John 
F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in the United 
States. Prior to the introduction of improved control 
techniques, the airport suffered an average of 300 
strikes per year (Dolbeer 1998) which based on the 
calculation above, would have cost the airlines that used 
the airport a total of around US$12 million each year. To 
combat the problem, the airport implemented a habitat 
management policy, hired a full-time wildlife biologist, 
employed a team of shooters to kill gulls flying over the 
property during the main risk period and recruited a 
bird control company specializing in falconry to assist 
the airport operations staff who carry out routine bird 
dispersal duties throughout the year. Although there 
is some debate about the relative effectiveness of the 
different components of the new bird management pro-
gram (Dolbeer 1998), the implementation of shooting 
alone reduced the number of strikes from around 170 
per year to around 50 per year during the period that 
the shooting teams were in place (Dolbeer et al. 1993, 
Dolbeer and Chipman 1999). The 120 strikes thus pre-
vented would have cost the airlines using the airport 
US$4,764,600 each year, compared to the cost of the 
shooting programme which was US$120,000 per year 
(R.A. Dolbeer personal communication).
THE POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS 
OF FURTHER INVESTMENT 
IN AIRPORT WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT
To determine whether additional investment in 
bird management would result in significant savings, the 
costs of the bird strikes that would be prevented must 
be determined. If the strikes that are prevented carry 
the average cost of US$39,705 calculated above, then 
it would require only a reduction of 5 strikes to cover 
the total costs of a program of the sort required to 
reach Milsom and Horton’s bird control efficiency score 
of 75%. Similarly, the example quoted from JFK airport 
above resulted in a save:spend ratio of 39:1. Unfortu-
nately, the organizations required to invest in the addi-
tional control (the airports) are not those that benefit 
from the reduced bird strike costs (the airlines).
There are a number of options available to link 
the costs and benefits of investment in bird strike pre-
vention. One would be for airports to increase the land-
ing fees charged to airlines by a small amount per flight 
and to invest this money in improved bird control. Pro-
viding that data could be gathered to show that the 
increased investment had paid dividends in terms of a 
reduction in bird strikes, it may be possible to persuade 
the airlines that a small increase in landing fees is an 
acceptable price to pay for improved safety and reduced 
damage and delays. An alternative approach would be 
for national regulators to require a certain level of bird 
control in the same way that other safety features such 
as fire and emergency services are required at a certain 
level for a particular category of airport. At present, 
some nations (e.g., the United States, Canada, Australia, 
and most European countries) have some level of formal 
inspection of bird control practices, such as an annual 
audit by a regulator. Only France has formal require-
ments for a specified level of bird control provision 
for airports of different sizes. In the developing world, 
many airports have no bird control requirement, and 
hence no bird control. It is at these airports where 
airlines have the greatest potential to invest money in 
bird control, which would result in a net benefit by pro-
ducing a greater savings in reduced bird strike damage 
and delays. Assisting airports in the developing world 
with the development of even elementary bird control 
programs where none existed before could substantially 
reduce the bird strike frequency suffered by the airlines 
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that operate there. In countries where labor costs are 
low, the prevention of 1 average bird strike might be 
sufficient to pay for an entire year’s bird control pro-
gram. Given that airports with no bird control are likely 
to suffer from a greater proportion of costly strikes 
by large and/or flocking birds (those that would be 
dispersed first if properly targeted bird control was in 
place), the potential savings provided by this invest-
ment would be even greater. The converse of this argu-
ment applies to those airports with sophisticated and 
expensive bird control programs already in place. At 
these sites, the number of strikes by large birds or 
flocks should be lower and the majority of bird strikes 
will be with small non-damaging bird species. The ben-
efits of investing in improved bird control at these sites 
may thus be lower, but at present there are insufficient 
airport-specific data on bird strike costs to allow this 
hypothesis to be tested.
COSTS OF DESIGNING AIRCRAFT 
TO WITHSTAND BIRD STRIKES
Many aircraft components are required to pass a 
bird-impact test before being allowed into service. The 
test is designed so that the probability of a catastrophic 
accident following the failure of the system or compo-
nent is less than 1 in every 109 flying hours. An engine, 
for example, might have to demonstrate the ability to 
provide a certain level of power for a specified period 
of time following an impact with a given number of 
birds of a given weight. When these certification tests 
are designed, a calculation is undertaken which evalu-
ates the frequency of strikes with a particular size and 
number of birds, the probability of an engine losing 
power after hitting a bird of this size, and the prob-
ability of that power loss leading to a crash. Effective 
bird control can have a profound effect on that calcula-
tion. If airport bird controllers target the large bird spe-
cies and flocks of birds that are more likely to cause 
damage (Milsom and Horton 1995), the probability of 
a catastrophic power loss is reduced. When calculating 
the need for a particular level of certification test, regu-
lators set a target of no more than 1 catastrophic inci-
dent in 109 flying hours as an acceptable level of safety. 
If bird strikes with the most hazardous species can 
be reduced in frequency to the point where the risk 
of catastrophe is lower than this threshold, then more 
stringent certification tests may be avoided and the need 
to design additional robustness into an engine may be 
eliminated. The stronger the engine, the heavier and 
less fuel-efficient it becomes. This not only increases the 
fuel costs to the operator, but also increases the levels of 
pollutant gasses discharged into the upper atmosphere 
by aircraft. Such gases are known to contribute to global 
warming, the costs of which are beyond the scope of 
this paper to estimate.
CONCLUSION
The estimate of US$1.2 billion per year for 
damage and delays to commercial transport aircraft 
caused by bird strikes is probably conservative and 
should be interpreted with caution as the data which 
underlie it are limited, and the assumptions made to 
arrive at the final figure are considerable. As airlines col-
lect more data and differentiate bird strikes from other 
foreign-object damage, it will be possible to produce a 
more refined analysis. This will permit the separation 
of different bird species, airlines, and airports to better 
identify the costs and benefits involved in bird strike 
prevention. Nevertheless, it is clear that a substantial 
amount of the annual cost of bird strikes could be saved 
if properly targeted investment in bird strike prevention 
is made in the future. In the intensely competitive air 
travel industry, the key is to connect the savings due to 
reductions in bird strike costs with the investment in 
airport bird control. It will also be necessary to develop 
methods to gather the data needed to evaluate the true 
cost effectiveness of increasing bird control provision 
and of the existing bird strike measures currently in 
place at airports.
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